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Abstract
Downsizing is an organizational activity designed to purposefully reduce the size
of the organization by eliminating positions and jobs (Cascio, 1993:96). This business
strategy has been used for many years in both the public and private sectors and is
expected to continue. Downsizing has been shown to have an affect on the employees
the organization retains, often termed survivors, and has been linked to increased
turnover and decreased productivity and effectiveness. With the expected continuation of
downsizing actions in the Department of Defense (DoD) and the possible affective
reactions experienced by survivors, the intent of this research is to identify the effect
downsizing has on attrition rates of military personnel to provide insight to leadership in
their decision making process when considering downsizing actions across the DoD.
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THE EFFECT OF DOWNSIZING ON ATTRITION RATES IN THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE (DOD)

I. Introduction

Resolved, that the commanding officer be and he is hereby directed
to discharge the troops now in the service of the United States, except
twenty-five privates, to guard the stores at Fort Pitt, and fifty-five to guard
the stores at West Point and other magazines, with a proportionate number
of officers; no officer to remain in service above the rank of a captain.
Resolution of the Continental Congress; Disbanding
the Continental Army, 2 June 1784 (Department of the Army,
1992:Ch 6, 0)
Chapter Overview
Downsizing is an organizational activity designed to purposefully reduce the size
of an organization by eliminating positions and jobs (Cascio, 1993:96). This business
strategy has been used in both the public and private sectors for many years and is
expected to continue. The long standing usage of downsizing is evidenced in the opening
quotation of this chapter where the Continental Congress disbanded the Continental
Army after the Revolutionary War. In the recent past, research on this organizational
strategy has been plentiful and indicates that downsizing has been shown to have an
affect on the employees the organization retains, often termed survivors, and has been
linked to increased turnover and decreased productivity and effectiveness.
With the expected continuation of downsizing actions in the Department of
Defense (DoD) and the possible affective reactions experienced by survivors, the intent
of this research is to identify the effect downsizing has on attrition rates of military
personnel to provide insight to leadership in their decision making process when
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considering downsizing actions across the DoD. This chapter provides a recent
background on downsizing, a discussion of the research purpose, and a brief discussion
on the methodology for this research effort.

Recent Downsizing Background
During the troubled economic times of the 1980s and early 1990s, many civilian
organizations implemented downsizing as a way of reducing costs (Clair and Dufresne,
2004:1597). In fact, AT&T implemented an incentive plan in 1989 to eliminate 12,000
jobs, an action that resulted in an estimated $450 million in savings per year (Dichter and
Trank, 1991:40). Other companies showed the same interest in downsizing and realized
similar financial gains. In the early 1990s, after comparing itself to other international
chemical companies, Du Pont decided it needed to reduce costs by one billion dollars
(Cascio, 1993:96). The cost reductions came partly from an elimination of 2,500 whitecollar jobs from its fibers business and another 20% from in-house engineering (Cascio,
1993:96).
Downsizing has also been used to restructure organizations to gain efficiencies or
competitiveness (Cameron, 1994:192). In 2006, Ford Motor Company announced that its
restructuring plan would include closing ten plants and cutting 25,000 hourly jobs, with
an ultimate goal of gaining efficiencies to increase capacity utilization, expand into new
markets, and to increase their diminishing market share (Hoffman, 2006:para 1). Another
example of such a downsizing purpose occurred following the end of the Cold War where
military manning in the DoD decreased by over 700,000, or 33%, and civilian DoD
employees decreased by over 300,000, or 37% (Zamparelli, 1999:13). Prior to the end of
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the Cold War, the DoD was sized to simultaneously fight and win two major wars on two
fronts. After the Cold War, however, the environment changed to smaller, more regional
threats (Schwan, 1995:1) This redefinition triggered the need for a smaller force (DoD-a,
2006:V-7).
The trend of downsizing is expected to continue in the DoD, this time however,
with shrinking budgets and the need for replacement of weapons systems, the purpose
appears to be cost savings. In fact, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report
indicates the DoD will continue to downsize, with the Air Force expecting to lose an
additional 40,000 positions in the next five years (DoD-b, 2006:47).
Many researchers have explored the affective reactions of survivors following a
downsizing action. Devin, Reay, Stainton, and Collins-Nakai (2003:10) found survivors
experience feelings of anger, depression, fear, distrust, and guilt. Moreover, these
feelings have been linked to several emotional outcomes that include reduced
organizational commitment and increased turnover intentions (Spreitzer and Mishra,
2002:719-721). Other factors, such as role overload and lack of role clarity, can be
present after a downsizing action and can lead to the same emotional outcomes of
decreased organizational attachment and increased turnover intentions (Allen, Freeman,
Russell, Reizenstein, and Rentz, 2001:149). While downsizing is meant to purposefully
reduce the size of an organization, the dysfunctional or unplanned turnover of those the
organization wishes to retain can harm the organization’s productivity and effectiveness
(Abelson and Baysinger, 1984:331; Cascio, 1993:99-100). Additionally, turnover costs
for employees who leave the organization can be substantial; in fact, estimates can be as
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high as $186,000 (inflated to 2005 dollars) per employee (Klewer, Shaffer, and Binnig,
1995:12). Moreover, though some organizations downsize as a managerial strategy to
help reduce costs and increase productivity, most organizations experience the opposite
effect (West, 2000:7).
Research Purpose
Because downsizing is expected to continue in the DoD (DoD-b, 2006:47), this
research will analyze the effect downsizing has on the attrition rates of military personnel
in the years following a downsizing action. Specifically, this research will analyze
attrition rates and military end strengths by fiscal year to determine whether, in the years
following a downsizing action, attrition rates will increase. The question will be
addressed for the overall DoD and each branch of service to compare differences based
on these categories.
Methodology
To complete the proposed research in the DoD setting, authorizations, endstrengths, and attrition rates, by service and grade, were retrieved from the Defense
Manpower Data Center (DMDC). Data for control variables used in the analysis were
retrieved from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the Military Officer Association of
America (MOAA), and Public Affairs and research offices for the services. A panel
regression analysis was performed on this data to determine the effects of downsizing on
attrition rates in the DoD.
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Chapter Summary
As discussed, downsizing has been used as a business strategy in both the public
and private sectors for many years and is expected to continue. Downsizing has been
linked to increased dysfunctional turnover and such unexpected turnover can cost
organizations substantial dollars. Because of the possibility of unexpected turnover in the
DoD based on its downsizing decisions, as well as the large costs of such unexpected
turnover, this research is intended to identify the effect downsizing has on future attrition
rates of military personnel. To accomplish this task, this paper will continue with a
review of related literature, followed by a more detailed discussion of the methodology
and a presentation of the data, an interpretation of the results, and a conclusion to
summarize the findings of the analysis and suggest areas for future research.
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II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
The literature on downsizing is plentiful, ranging from unsupported advice on
how to downsize to empirical studies on organizations that have downsized. Since the
purpose of this research is to study the effect downsizing has on attrition rates of military
personnel in the years following a downsizing action, this chapter will give an overview
of the downsizing literature with a brief discussion on why firms downsize, followed by a
focus on the implications of downsizing on survivors and the organization, a section on
the effects of downsizing in a military setting, and a discussion regarding how this
research is linked to the civilian sector.
Why Organizations Downsize
Downsizing is thought to reduce costs, improve efficiencies, and improve
competitiveness (De Meuse, Bergmann, Vanderheiden, and Roraff, 2004:156). Because
of this, it has been used as a business strategy for many years (Lurie, 1998:6-7). Prior to
the late 1980s, downsizing was used primarily as a response to survive an economic crisis
(Gandolfi and Neck, 2003:16; Lurie, 1998:7). In the 1990s, however, companies who
were financially strong were also downsizing (Lurie, 1998:6). Downsizing in profitable
firms can perhaps be explained because organizational downsizing is said to have a
positive impact on the firm’s financial performance by eliminating inefficient processes
and reducing labor costs (De Meuse and others, 2004:158). Moreover, it is commonly
thought that the firm will increase its profitability by implementing a downsizing strategy
even if the firm is already profitable.
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Empirical results in the literature, however, seem to be inconsistent on this ruling.
Studies have shown that increases in financial performance are not always enjoyed by
firms that downsize. In 1998, for example, Cascio found that several companies’
financial performance in the Standard and Poor’s 500 did not appear to change
dramatically, positively or negatively, based on downsizing actions (Cascio, 1998:69). In
another study, results showed “the market generally viewed downsizing actions
negatively because of concerns that losses from human capital will exceed the benefits
gained from lower costs” (Nixon, Hitt, Lee, and Jeong, 2004:1128). Yet another study
found that while company performance was worse in the two years following a
downsizing, long term performance was likely to improve beginning in the third year
(DeMeuse and others 2004:172).
Even with inconsistent financial performance results, downsizing has become part
of corporate culture and organizations continue to downsize. The Department of Defense
(DoD) is no different. The organization has reduced its manpower by more than 33%
since the end of the Cold War (Zamparelli, 1999:13) and it is continuing to use
downsizing as a business strategy. DoD leaders are currently motivated to apply this
strategy because there is a need to transform the services due to changing threats and
fewer dollars available for modernization (DoD-b, 2006:V-7). As shown in Figure 1,
some researchers believe the reduction in dollars available for modernization, aging
equipment, and rising operations and maintenance costs are requiring the DoD to utilize
money-saving strategies in order to avoid a decline in future readiness (Anderson,
McGuiness, and Spicer 2002:93). As discussed in the 2006 Quadrennial Review Report
(QDR), downsizing appears to be one of the ways the DoD is going to realize these
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savings to redirect resources for modernization (DoD-b, 2006:V-7). Table 1 shows the
expected outlays by appropriation in the DoD for 2006 and 2007 (other specific
appropriations by year are not yet available). As shown, there is an expected decrease in
personnel outlays from 2006 to 2007, with an accompanying increase in procurement and
research, development, test, and evaluation dollars.

Figure 1. DoD Readiness Death Spiral.
(Anderson and others, 2002:93).

Table 1. Outlays by Function and Subfunction
Outlays by Function and Subfunction
Military Personnel
Operation and Maintenance

Procurement
Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation

2006
116,346
192,563
88,754

2007
109,892
161,514
89,734

70,766
72,112
7,322
8,326
Military Construction
3,824
3,868
Family Housing
30,058
55,882
Anticipated funding for Global War on Terror
2,420
3,526
Other
514,059 504,854
Shown in millions; Estimates of outlays for 2006 and 2007
Source: Office of Management and Budget, 2007:60
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Implications of Downsizing
When coupled with downsizing’s inconsistent financial performance results, there
may be longer term organizational issues that arise because of the possible negative
effects on the survivors left in the organization (Cascio, 1993:99-100; Palmer, Kabanoff,
and Dunford, 1997:623-624). These effects have been studied by many researchers and
evidence shows that survivors may experience increased anxiety and stress, and
decreased organizational commitment, morale, motivation, and productivity (Allen and
others, 2001:148-149; Cascio, 1993:99-101; Godkin, Valentine, and St. Pierre, 2002:66;
Spreitzer and Mishra, 2002:719-721). Research also shows that these reactions are linked
to decreased attachment and an increased intent to turnover (Allen and others, 2001:148149; Spreitzer and Mishra, 2002:719-721). Furthermore, such turnover can cost an
organization thousands per employee (Darmon, 1990:53; Klewer, Shaffer, and Binnig,
1995:12).
Mishra and Spreitzer (1998:572-573) developed a theoretical framework to
explain survivor reactions. This framework posits that when survivors appraise
downsizing as a threat, where their perceptions indicate the downsizing action is unfair,
their reactions are less positive. This can be countered by helping the individuals cope
with the downsizing, through empowerment and work redesign initiatives. (Mishra and
Spreitzer, 1998:572-573). Spreitzer and Mishra (2002: 710) tested this framework
empirically, showing predictors of survivor attachment as trustworthiness of
management, empowerment, and justice. These levels of attachment were significantly
related to actual turnover (Spreitzer and Mishra, 2002:719-721).
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In a similar study, Allen and others applied work role transition theory to explain
survivor reactions over time (2001:147). Work role transition can be described as
changes in position requirements or context such as job redesign, change of boss or coworkers, or inter and intra-organizational mobility (Allen and others, 2001:147). Though
work role transitions such as job redesign can be positive based on the perception of the
survivor (Spreitzer and Mishra, 2002:714), role overload and lack of role clarity that may
accompany the redesigns in a downsizing setting can have a negative effect (Allen and
others, 2001:149). By measuring variables such as role clarity, role overload, job
involvement, satisfaction with top management, and satisfaction with job security, Allen
and others found that employee attitudes were less favorable and that such attitudes
related to a higher intent to turnover in the time immediately following a downsizing
(2001:159).
If the employee does in fact decide to leave the firm, turnover costs can be very
expensive for the organization. In a study published by Darmon, it was shown that costs
related to turnover can include exit interviews, severance pay, recruiting, training,
differential operating costs, and differential skill costs (1990:48). Additionally, it was
estimated that turnover costs the company $75,000 per employee (inflated to 2005
dollars). Estimates of turnover costs will vary based on factors such as position and skill
level required, and other literature suggests that turnover costs can be as high as $186,000
per employee (inflated to 2005 dollars) (Klewer and others, 1995:12).
In sum, the research has suggested that downsizing creates a greater level of
disenchantment among employees and these employees consider leaving the
organization. Indeed, such intentions to turnover have been shown to be a strong
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predictor of actual turnover, though actual intent-behavior relationships vary widely
across studies (Griffeth, Hom, and Gaertner, 2000: 465-476). Fortunately, when these
intentions are triggered with a downsizing event, they may not persist. Allen and others
found that the period of increased turnover usually lasts approximately one year
following the downsizing action, at which point survivor attitudes may begin returning to
their pre-downsizing levels (2001:159). Still, there is a period where organizations
appear to lose quality employees that would otherwise be retained and risk thousands in
turnover costs.

Effects in a Military Setting
Based on the theories that have been highlighted, it would be reasonable to think
that military members might respond to downsizing experiences in a similar fashion.
According to a recent survey, job security is the number two reason, preceded only by
benefits, that federal employees plan to stay on their jobs (Gansler and Lucyshyn,
2004:19). With job security as a key prospect for federal employees, it is additional
confirmation that similar survivor reactions could be expected.
Other military challenges may alter the effects of downsizing in the DoD. One of
these challenges is the increase in the frequency of military deployments. For example,
in 1999, an average of 12,000 Airmen were deployed per day as compared to an average
of 2,000 per day in 1989 (Zamparelli, 1999:13). The frequency of these deployments
increased, while strength levels in the Air Force, for example, decreased by 210,000
during the same time (DoD-a, 2006:1). Intuitively, a reduced force, coupled with more
frequent deployments, may serve to complicate mission accomplishment because
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commanders may be forced to multi-task their personnel in order to attempt to get the
mission accomplished. Thus, survivors are left performing multiple and conflicting roles,
often resulting in stress, burnout, and turnover (Rusaw, 2005:482). Such work role
transition issues experienced by the survivors that result from downsizing have been
related to decreased organizational commitment and increased turnover intentions (Allen
and others, 2001:149).
While downsizing in the military has not been studied explicitly, other work role
transition events, such as those brought on by outsourcing in the military, have been
shown to reduce job satisfaction and ultimately correlate to an increase in turnover
intentions (Kennedy, Holt, Ward, and Rehg, 2002:23). Additionally, replenishment of
trained personnel could also be a problem in that “legislative constraints often make it
difficult to replace employees in a timely manner” (Kennedy and others, 2002:24).
Link to Current Research
The theories presented in the empirical research of civilian firms have been
analyzed in the current research with an aggregate quantitative retrospective look at the
DoD’s downsizing events and comparing those events to aggregate attrition rates in the
years following the event. Using the theories presented as a guide, it was expected that
DoD reactions to downsizing would closely relate to those in the private sector. It is
important to note that besides issues related to replenishing the workforce, the DoD is
different than the private sector in that military members incur service commitments.
Civilian employees often have far more choices regarding the time they leave an
organization. In contrast, military members are obligated to serve a specified period of
time where leaving may be prohibited. As discussed previously, Allen and others found
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that the increase in turnover following a downsizing lasts approximately one year and if
the service member’s commitment requirement extends beyond this period, it may skew
the results of this analysis by lowering the attrition rates. Still, based on the possibility of
the unplanned, or dysfunctional loss of human capital and its possible affects on mission
accomplishment, effectiveness, productivity (Abelson and Baysinger, 1984; Rusaw,
2005) and increased turnover costs (Darmon, 1990:53; Klewer and others, 1995:12), this
research hopes to offer insight into changes in DoD attrition following downsizing
actions.

Chapter Summary
This chapter has focused on the why firms downsize, the implications of
downsizing, and the effects of downsizing in the military setting. Since downsizing is
expected to continue despite its questionable financial implications and effects on
employees (Cascio, 1993:102; Palmer and others, 1997:623-624), the remainder of this
paper will focus on answering the research question and attempt to determine the effect
of downsizing on attrition rates in the DoD by discussing the methodology and data, the
results of the empirical analysis of DoD’s past downsizing and attrition, followed by
conclusions and recommendations.
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III. Data and Methodology
Chapter Overview
This chapter presents the data and methodology used to answer the research
question of how downsizing affects attrition rates in the DoD. The discussion includes
the sources of the data and how it was used in the analysis, control variables utilized, the
pre-estimation stationarity test and model specification, and the limitations of this
research.
Data
To complete the proposed research in the DoD setting, end-strengths and attrition
rates were retrieved from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). Data for control
variables used in the analysis were retrieved from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS),
the Military Officer Association of America (MOAA), and Public Affairs and research
offices for the services.
All data were gathered from 1974-2005. Because the draft ended in 1973
(Gullason, 1989:291), the analysis begins with 1974 to avoid skewing the results based
on involuntary service and lack of attrition choices. According to the DMDC, actual
authorization rates, which more closely fit the definition of downsizing presented in
Chapter One, were not available prior to 1996. Attempts were made to collect such data
from the services’ archives, but the data were also not available from those sources.
Though actual authorizations would present more accurate analysis in tune with the
definition of downsizing presented in Chapter One, only ten years of data could be
analyzed. As a result, end-strength levels from after the end of the draft, which were
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available for 31 years, were used to determine downsizing events since they should
closely mirror personnel authorizations provided by Congress. Intuitively, the effects of
a reduction in manpower would be similar regardless of the source of the reduction.
Downsizing, therefore, was characterized in this analysis as the difference in the overall
end-strength for the fiscal year in question from the previous fiscal year. Attrition rates
were defined as the number of personnel from each category who left the military in one
year, divided by the total end strength at the end of the previous fiscal year.

Control Variables
To attempt to isolate the possible causation effects of downsizing on attrition
rates, stop-loss, economic conditions, and additional military pay raises were used as
control variables in this analysis. This data was gathered from Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS), the Military Officer Association of America (MOAA), and Public Affairs and
research offices for the services.
Stop-loss is a program in the military where persons in specific job classifications
(and at times, all job classifications), are prevented from leaving the military even if
service commitments have been completed (Burgess, 2004: Para 2). The authority for
this program comes from Title 10 of United States Code, Section 12305 (U.S. Code
Collection, 2006: Para a). This program was generally implemented across the DoD
during Desert Storm in 1990-1991 and shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks. It is not until this program is lifted that people can be released from the military.
The second control variable, economic conditions, was used to capture personnel
who may choose to leave if they perceive better economic opportunities in the private
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sector. A measurement of the economy, called the “Misery Index” is being used in this
analysis as a proxy for economic conditions. The Misery Index is the sum of the
unemployment and inflation rates as obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The
final control variable, additional military pay raises, represents the delta between the
military pay raise and average civilian pay raises as indicated by the Government’s
annual employment cost index (ECI) for that year (all variables and their descriptions are
shown in Table 2).
Table 2. Variable Information
Variable
Name

ATTR

Definition

Variable Value

Coefficient Meaning

Attrition rate (ATTR):
attrition numbers from
the current year divided
by the end strength from
the previous year

Positive means attrition
rate goes up

N/A (Dependent Variable)

Negative means the
service downsized

If negative, means as
downsize, attrition rates go
up

If positive, means the
military got a higher pay
raise

If negative, means if
military got higher raise,
attrition rates go down

Dummy variable-value
of 1 if the program was
implemented
Unemployment rate is
always positive; the
overall index could be
negative if inflation is
more negative than
unemployment; for this
timeframe, the index
was always positive

If negative, means if SL
implemented, attrition
rates go down

SL

Downsizing rate (DZ):
(End strength current yr
minus end strength
previous yr) / by end
strength previous yr
The difference between
the military pay raise for
that year and the
Employment Cost Index
(ECI)
Stop Loss (SL) program
was implemented for the
service for more than
one quarter during the
fiscal year

Misery

“Misery Index” : The
unemployment rate plus
the inflation rate

DZ

Raise
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If negative, means if the
misery index goes up,
attrition rates go down

Pre-Estimation Test and Model Specification
The data was first tested for stationarity using the Augmented Dicky Fuller (ADF)
test. Stationarity exists when the statistical properties of the data do not change over time
(Makridakis, Wheelwright, and Hyndman, 1998:324). In time series, interpretation from
analysis that uses non-stationary data can lead to spurious results and erroneous
conclusions regarding relationships among the variables (Kennedy, 2003:319). All
datasets used in this analysis were stationary. The results of the ADF are shown in
Appendix B.
A fixed effects panel model was used in the DoD overall analysis. Panel analysis
allows analysis to be performed with both cross-sectional units of observation and a
temporal dimension (Yaffee, 2003:2). Since the data includes each of the branches of
service in the DoD, a fixed effects model was used because this type of model produces
results conditional on the cross-sectional units under analysis, and that is what is relevant
for this research (Kennedy, 2003:312). Additionally, the fixed effects model was used
because it is both effective at dealing with omitted variable bias and is robust to
normality (Kennedy, 2003:304-307, 311-312).

The representation of the model for this research is:
ATTRit = αit +β1DZit + β2Raiseit + β3SLit + β4Miseryit + εit

where

(1)

i = {Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps}, t = {1974, 1975…2005}, ATTR is

attrition rates, DZ is the downsizing rate, Raise is the delta between the military pay raise
and the ECI, SL is stop loss, and Misery is the misery index.
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The downsizing rate was lagged at periods of one and two years to determine how
long the effects, if any, lasted. Downsizing was lagged for one year to determine if the
DoD follows the civilian sector in that reactions to downsizing return to normal in
approximately one year (Allen and others, 2001:159). A second year of lagged
downsizing was used to attempt to capture the effect of a delay in attrition due to service
commitments held by members. Lagging the downsizing rate also alleviates the
possibility of duplication in counting the loss of members in both the end-strength
numbers used in the downsizing calculation and in the attrition rate for the same year.
To further define the appropriate model specification to use in this analysis, the
Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) was reviewed for several different preliminary
regressions based on varying lag lengths of the variables and autoregressive (AR)
specifications. The AIC is a popular way of determining the goodness of fit of the model
while maintaining parsimony (Makridakis and others, 1998:360; Kennedy, 2003:117).
Smaller AICs indicate better fitting models. The AICs from the analysis are shown
below in Tables 3 and 4. Since stop-loss and the military pay raise delta from the EIC
would intuitively garner more immediate effects, the AIC was reviewed only when
lagging downsizing at one and two years, adding an AR term of one, two, and three, and
lagging the misery index for one, two, and three years.

18

Table 3. Akaike Information Criteria (lagging downsizing on year)
AR
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3

DZ
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Raise
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

SL
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Misery
0
1
2
3
0
1
2
3
0
1
2
3

AIC
-5.156107
-5.199011
-5.287868
-5.196848
-5.422236
-5.413939
-5.320706
-5.225314
-5.50429
-5.491408
-5.315219
-5.282801

R2
0.824497
0.831868
0.817273
0.785961
0.843125
0.841671
0.814242
0.794796
0.848133
0.846164
0.815881
0.800377

Table 4. Akaike Information Criteria (lagging downsizing two years)
AR
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3

DZ
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Raise
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

SL
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Misery
0
1
2
3
0
1
2
3
0
1
2
3

AIC
-5.401149
-5.32031
-5.317446
-5.215537
-5.46481
-5.382943
-5.293025
-5.200373
-5.436078
-5.373958
-5.299356
-5.316377

R2
0.836844
0.823107
0.822599
0.789924
0.839171
0.825796
0.809028
0.789613
0.836841
0.826384
0.812937
0.806968

Limitations
As discussed in Chapter Two, the theories presented in the empirical research of
civilian firms have been analyzed in the current research with an aggregate quantitative
retrospective look at the DoD’s downsizing events and comparing those events to
aggregate attrition rates in the years following the event. By looking at the aggregate
results of downsizing and attrition for the past 31 years, along with the control variables
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of the military pay raise exceeding the ECI, whether or not stop-loss was implemented,
and the economic conditions of the nation using the misery index, it is recognized that
this aggregate study is unable to capture specific personal reasons for departing the
military and cannot differentiate if the attrition numbers increased or decreased
specifically because of downsizing. However, while downsizing in the military and the
resulting effect on attrition rates has not been studied explicitly, other work role transition
events, such as those brought on by outsourcing in the military, have been empirically
shown to reduce job satisfaction and ultimately correlate to an increase in turnover
intentions. Together with the empirical research of civilian firms indicating that
downsizing appears to be correlated with subsequent attrition rates, it is believed using
the selected methodology will offer insight into the effects of downsizing on attrition
rates in the DoD.

Chapter Summary
This chapter has provided the methodology and data used in this research. In the
following chapters, an interpretation of the results and a conclusion to summarize the
findings of the analysis and suggest areas for future research are provided.
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IV. Results
Chapter Overview
This chapter discusses the results of the analysis for the overall DoD and each
branch of service within the DoD. As stated previously, fixed-effects panel regression
analysis was performed. The chapter follows with a discussion of the post-estimation
tests and the results for the overall DoD and each of the services.

Post-Estimation Tests
To determine independence of the residuals in each model, the Durbin-Watson
test statistic was calculated. Lack of independence of residuals indicates autocorrelation
in a model. That is, the model is autocorrelated when the error term in one period is
correlated with the error term in the previous time period (Salvatore and Reagle,
2002:208). If the model possesses autocorrelation, the model is subject to downwardbiased standard errors and incorrect statistical tests (Salvatore and Reagle, 2002:208).
Autocorrelation can be corrected by adding an autoregressive (AR) specification term to
the model estimates. In each of the models, if autocorrelation was present, an appropriate
AR term was added, as incorporated with the model specification information achieved
from the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) discussed in the previous chapter. The
Durbin-Watson results are shown with the model results later in this chapter. The further
away from two the Durbin-Watson test statistic is, the less certain that autocorrelation is
not present; additionally, the critical values vary based on the number of observations and
the number of independent variables used in the analysis. A table indicating the DurbinWatson critical values and their definitions are shown in Appendix C.
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Another important consideration in regression analysis is determining if the model
has heteroskedasticity. If a model is heteroskedastic, the assumption of the variance of
the error term being constant is violated (Salvatore and Reagle, 2002:207). If the error
term is constant, the model is said to be homoscedastistic, which is the desired outcome.
If a model is found to be heteroskedastic, this leads to unbiased, but inefficient estimates
of the coefficients as well as biased estimates of the standard errors (Salvatore and
Reagle, 2002:207). If heteroskedasticity is found, using robust standard errors from
White’s heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator provides correct
estimates of the coefficient. Each of the models in this analysis were initially found to
have heteroskedasticity, therefore, the estimates were derived using White’s
heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator.

Overall DoD and Service Results
A comparison of the results for the overall DoD model and each of the service
models, lagging downsizing for one and two years, is shown in Table 5. As you can see,
downsizing is statistically significant in all models, except lagging for one year in the
Marine Corps model (USMC). Additionally, the model specification appears to explain a
majority of the variation in attrition rates for the overall DoD, the Air Force (USAF), the
Navy (USN), and the USMC. The explanation in variation of attrition rates is
approximately half for the Army (USA). The R^2 is highest for the USAF and is the
lowest for the USA using both model specifications. Furthermore, the downsizing effect
is greatest for the USAF and the least for the USMC. In fact, downsizing is not
statistically significant when lagging downsizing for one year in the USMC model, and
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appears to decrease attrition rates in the USMC when lagging for two years, which is the
opposite effect expected. The DoD models and each of the service models is explained in
more detail in the following sections.

Table 5. Comparison of Models for Downsizing Effect
Comparison of Models for Effect of Downsizing
Service

Overall DoD
Army
Air Force
Navy
Marine Corps
Overall DoD
Army
Air Force
Navy
Marine Corps

R^2

Coefficient
for DZ

DZ lagged One Year
0.848133
-0.288043
0.531676
-0.279141
0.730472
-0.378201
0.700271
-0.339068
0.715498
-0.088753
DZ lagged Two Years
0.839171
-0.251769
0.440903
-0.174512
0.753328
-0.370313
0.691687
-0.343389
0.720966
0.369769

Statistical
Significance

***
***
***
***
Not significant
**
**
***
***
***

***significant to the 0.001 level, **0.05 level, *0.10 level

The overall DoD model, lagging downsizing for one and two years (Tables 6 and
7), explain a majority of the variation in attrition rates for the DoD (0.848133 and
0.839171 respectively). Downsizing was a statistically significant variable in lagging one
year to the 0.001 level and to the 0.05 level when lagging two years. This indicates that
if downsizing occurs, attrition rates will increase for both one and two years following
the downsizing action (since the dataset portrays downsizing rates as negative numbers,
multiplying the negative coefficient would garner an increase in attrition rates). The
control variables sl, raise, and misery are also statistically significant for each overall
DoD model and indicate if stop-loss is enacted, the attrition rates will go down; if the
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military pay raise is higher than the ECI, attrition will go down; and surprisingly, if the
misery index increases, attrition rates will up. The magnitude, however, is very small for
each of these control variables. Additionally, there is no autocorrelation present, as
evidenced by the Durbin-Watson statistic.

Table 6. DoD Overall Model Results, Lagging One Year
Dependent Variable: ATTR
Sample(adjusted): 1975 2005
Total panel (balanced) observations: 112
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable
DZ(-1)
RAISE
SL
MISERY
AR(1)
AR(2)
AR(3)
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

-0.288043
-0.001608
-0.023692
0.003384
-0.124402
0.109484
0.115962
0.848133
0.833097
0.014734
319.2402
2.087875

0.062932 -4.577052
0.000660 -2.435672
0.005102 -4.643368
0.000405
8.345285
0.125055 -0.994779
0.057022
1.920034
0.073217
1.583816
Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.0000
0.0166
0.0000
0.0000
0.3222
0.0577
0.1164
0.166922
0.036065
0.021926
56.40563
0.000000

Table 7. DoD Overall Model Results, Lagging Two Years
Dependent Variable: ATTR
Sample(adjusted): 1976 2005
Total panel (balanced) observations: 112
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable
DZ(-2)
RAISE
SL
MISERY
AR(1)
AR(2)
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

-0.251769
-0.002301
-0.018781
0.003837
0.091605
-0.025173
0.839171
0.824980
0.015088
316.0293
2.089133

0.079863 -3.152503
0.000731 -3.147853
0.005491 -3.420243
0.000401
9.559277
0.092918
0.985864
0.093172 -0.270182
Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.0021
0.0022
0.0009
0.0000
0.3265
0.7876
0.166922
0.036065
0.023220
59.13487
0.000000
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For the Army, where downsizing was lagged one and two years (Tables 8 and 9),
the overall model explains 0.531676 and 0.440903 of the variation in attrition rates. The
downsizing variable is significant at better than the 0.001 level and has a magnitude of 0.279141 when lagging downsizing for one year, meaning that if the service downsizes,
one year later, attrition rates will increase by 0.279141, the second lowest of any of the
service models. When lagging downsizing for two years, attrition rates still increase
when the service downsizes, but the magnitude decreases. Each of the variables are
statistically significant and indicate if the military pay raise were higher than the ECI,
attrition rates would go down; if stop-loss were implemented, attrition rates would
decrease, and if the economy worsens, attrition rates would go up. As with the overall
DoD, the economy proxy results are in the opposite direction expected. Additionally, the
coefficient magnitudes for the control variables are small. Finally, the residuals do not
indicate autocorrelation.
Table 8. Army Overall Model Results, Lagging One Year
Dependent Variable: ATTR
Sample(adjusted): 1975 2005
Included observations: 31 after adjusting endpoints
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable
DZ(-1)
RAISE
SL
MISERY
AR(1)
AR(2)
AR(3)
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

-0.279141
-0.003718
-0.021612
0.002985
-0.367946
0.018166
0.188818
0.531676
0.485307
0.017203
301.8876
2.263870

0.059370 -4.701745
0.000430 -8.647175
0.007487 -2.886478
0.000382
7.816072
0.148338 -2.480458
0.080002
0.227069
0.066388
2.844153
Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.0000
0.0000
0.0048
0.0000
0.0148
0.8208
0.0054
0.179139
0.023979
0.029890
11.46626
0.000000
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Table 9. Army Overall Model Results, Lagging Two Years
Dependent Variable: ATTR
Sample(adjusted): 1976 2005
Included observations: 30 after adjusting endpoints
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable
DZ_USA(-2)
RAISE
SL
MISERY
AR(1)
AR(2)
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

-0.174512
-0.003793
-0.020384
0.003423
-0.059845
-0.046522
0.440903
0.391571
0.018704
291.9665
2.190135

0.084871 -2.056209
0.000577 -6.574748
0.005807 -3.510104
0.000486
7.044326
0.102569 -0.583461
0.123930 -0.375387
Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.0423
0.0000
0.0007
0.0000
0.5609
0.7082
0.179139
0.023979
0.035684
8.937449
0.000000

The USAF models explain the highest amount of the variation in attrition rates of
the individual services (Tables 10 and 11). Additionally, the coefficient magnitudes for
downsizing are the greatest of any of the service models. As with the overall DoD and
the USA already discussed, the control variables each have a small magnitude and each
have the same effect. Autocorrelation is not present in either model.
Table 10. Air Force Overall Model Results, Lagging One Year
Dependent Variable: ATTR
Sample(adjusted): 1975 2005
Included observations: 31 after adjusting endpoints
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable
DZ(-1)
RAISE
SL
MISERY
AR(1)
AR(2)
AR(3)
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

-0.378201
-0.001323
-0.028672
0.003822
-0.509143
-0.122168
-0.071024
0.730472
0.703786
0.011166
350.2926
2.095879

0.023041 -16.41411
0.000415 -3.190566
0.003756 -7.632850
0.000141
27.04195
0.081217 -6.268886
0.086100 -1.418906
0.115804 -0.613317
Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.0000
0.0019
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.1590
0.5410
0.125082
0.020517
0.012593
27.37286
0.000000
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Table 11. Air Force Overall Model Results, Lagging Two Years
Dependent Variable: ATTR
Sample(adjusted): 1976 2005
Included observations: 30 after adjusting endpoints
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable
DZ(-2)
RAISE
SL
MISERY
AR(1)
AR(2)
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

-0.370313
-0.003004
-0.024303
0.003647
-0.221376
-0.452157
0.753328
0.731562
0.010630
355.2549
2.077051

0.025999 -14.24313
0.000469 -6.409207
0.004033 -6.026603
0.000139
26.27523
0.091135 -2.429110
0.109837 -4.116629
Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0169
0.0001
0.125082
0.020517
0.011525
34.61155
0.000000

In the USN models (Tables 12 and 13), the explanatory power of the models are
the third highest of any of the service models and the downsizing effect is the second
highest, only slightly behind the downsizing effect on attrition rates in the USAF. The
misery index and the stop-loss variable react as in each of the previously discussed
models; however, the coefficient for the military pay raise variable is not statistically
significant when lagging downsizing for one year.
Table 12. Navy Overall Model Results, Lagging One Year
Dependent Variable: ATTR
Sample(adjusted): 1975 2005
Included observations: 31 after adjusting endpoints
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable
DZ(-1)
RAISE
SL
MISERY
AR(1)
AR(2)
AR(3)
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

-0.339068
0.000768
-0.024152
0.002521
0.118319
0.207791
0.109329
0.700271
0.670595
0.011721
344.8660
1.866991

0.047570 -7.127820
0.000588
1.307929
0.003288 -7.345464
0.000782
3.221774
0.117284
1.008826
0.084774
2.451114
0.142735
0.765958
Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.0000
0.1939
0.0000
0.0017
0.3155
0.0160
0.4455
0.160540
0.020421
0.013875
23.59714
0.000000
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Table 13. Navy Overall Model Results, Lagging Two Years
Dependent Variable: ATTR
Sample(adjusted): 1976 2005
Included observations: 30 after adjusting endpoints
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable
DZ(-2)
RAISE
SL
MISERY
AR(1)
AR(2)
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

-0.343389
-0.001193
-0.013204
0.003918
0.321531
-0.040033
0.691687
0.664483
0.011829
343.2847
1.908696

0.061282 -5.603387
0.000684 -1.743969
0.003055 -4.321844
0.000374
10.46449
0.100355
3.203924
0.095149 -0.420738
Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.0000
0.0842
0.0000
0.0000
0.0018
0.6748
0.160540
0.020421
0.014272
25.42582
0.000000

The Marine Corps models (Tables 14 and 15) are much different than the other
services. The explanatory power of the models are similar when lagging downsizing for
both one and two years (0.715498 versus 0.720966); however, downsizing is not
statistically significant when lagging downsizing for one year, and when lagging for two
years, attrition rates appear to decrease. Additionally, stop-loss is not statistically
significant in either model. Neither model exhibits autocorrelation.
Table 14. Marine Corps Overall Model Results, Lagging One Year
Dependent Variable: ATTR
Sample(adjusted): 1975 2005
Included observations: 31 after adjusting endpoints
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable
DZ(-1)
RAISE
SL
MISERY
AR(1)
AR(2)
AR(3)
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

-0.088753
-0.001133
-0.006244
0.001185
0.457836
-0.067265
0.261464
0.715498
0.687329
0.012795
335.0386
2.186606

0.089864 -0.987626
0.000539 -2.101747
0.005047 -1.237263
0.000679
1.744628
0.085603
5.348336
0.061223 -1.098686
0.051907
5.037172
Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.3257
0.0381
0.2189
0.0841
0.0000
0.2745
0.0000
0.202927
0.022883
0.016536
25.40062
0.000000
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Table 15. Marine Corps Overall Model Results, Lagging Two Years
Dependent Variable: ATTR
Sample(adjusted): 1976 2005
Included observations: 30 after adjusting endpoints
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable
DZ(-2)
RAISE
SL
MISERY
AR(1)
AR(2)
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

0.369769
-0.001370
-0.005699
0.001732
0.580436
0.161774
0.720966
0.696345
0.012610
336.1253
2.190547

0.065268
5.665372
0.000447 -3.064167
0.005994 -0.950757
0.000619
2.797006
0.075418
7.696253
0.046049
3.513068
Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.0000
0.0028
0.3440
0.0062
0.0000
0.0007
0.202927
0.022883
0.016218
29.28291
0.000000

Chapter Summary
This chapter presented the results of the analysis in attempting to answer the
question of how downsizing affects attrition rates across the DoD. Additionally, postestimating testing was discussed to offer validity of the results. As noted, downsizing
appears to affect attrition rates when lagging downsizing for one year in the overall DoD
and in each of the services except the USMC. When lagging downsizing for two years,
the USMC is also very different than the other models in that downsizing appears to
decrease attrition rates. In the next chapter, the overall findings are discussed further and
suggestions for future follow-on research are offered.
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V. Conclusions
Chapter Overview
This chapter will address the overall findings of the analysis and provide answers
to the questions posed in Chapter One. Additionally, possible implications of the
analysis will be offered. Finally, this chapter will offer suggestions for future research in
the context of downsizing in the DoD.

Research Questions Answered
At the onset of this research, the question was posed: “How does downsizing
affect attrition rates in the DoD?” Additionally, the answer was sought for whether or not
these effects mirror the civilian sector as far as increased turnover duration due to
downsizing, where civilian affects appear to return to normal after approximately one
year, as found by Allen and others in their 2001 study.
Downsizing generally appears to affect attrition rates in the DoD. The overall
DoD model indicated the model was a very good fit in explaining attrition rates (see
Table 16). The service models, except for the USMC and USA models, indicate similar
results. Moreover, the downsizing variable was strongly statistically significant for all
models except the USMC one year after the downsizing action and for the overall DoD,
the USAF, and the USN, results were strong two years after a downsizing action as well.
The effect appears strongest in the USAF for both one and two years following a
downsizing action, as the coefficients are the highest. The USN followed a very close
second in coefficient magnitude. Interesting to note is that the USMC showed the lowest
effect one year following downsizing, though the result was not statistically significant.
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Additionally, of the other services where downsizing was statistically significant one year
following a downsizing action, the USA had the lowest magnitude of effect in attrition
rates based on downsizing. Moreover, the USMC showed that two years following a
downsizing action, their attrition rates actually decrease.
Table 16. Summary of Overall Results
Service

R^2

DZ

Overall
DoD

0.848

Army

0.532

Air Force

0.730

Navy
Marine
Corps

0.700
0.715

Overall
DoD

0.839

Army

0.441

Air Force

0.753

Navy
Marine
Corps

0.692

0.252(0.080)
0.175(0.085)
0.370(0.026)
0.343(0.061)

0.721

0.369(0.065)

0.288(0.063)
0.279(0.059)
0.378(0.023)
0.339(0.048)
0.088(0.090)

Raise
SL
DZ lagged One Year
*** 0.002(0.001) ** 0.024(0.005)
*** 0.004(0.000) *** 0.022(0.007)
*** 0.001(0.000) ** 0.029(0.004)
*** 0.001(0.001)
0.024(0.003)
0.001(0.001) ** 0.006(0.005)
DZ lagged Two Years
** 0.002(0.001) ** 0.019(0.005)
** 0.004(0.001) *** 0.020(0.006)
*** 0.003(0.000) *** 0.024(0.004)
*** 0.001(0.001) *
0.013(0.003)
*** 0.001(0.000) ** 0.006(0.006)

Misery

***

0.003(0.000)

***

**

0.003(0.000)

***

***

0.004(0.000)

***

***

0.003(0.001)

**

0.001(0.001)

*

***

0.004(0.000)

***

***

0.003(0.000)

***

***

0.004(0.000)

***

***

0.004(0.000)

***

0.002(0.001)

**

***significant to the 0.001 level, **0.05 level, *0.10 level

In general, the models showed the economic condition proxy, the misery index,
behaving in the opposite direction expected. That is, according to the results, if the
economy worsens, attrition rates will increase, though, as with the other control variables,
the magnitude is very small. This is perhaps because the data captured aggregate attrition
rates and aggregate national economic conditions, not broken down by employment
classification/career specialty of individuals or economic conditions in the locality where
the service member would relocate (perhaps their original home of record or where they

31

might have received a job offer). Additionally, individuals may have separated from the
service for reasons other than general national economic conditions. Finally, because of
the unusually high misery index of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the results of this
variable’s coefficient could have been affected.
While the military pay raise exceeding the ECI was statistically significant for the
overall DoD, the USA, the USAF, and the USMC, the USN results were not for one year
following a downsizing action, but increased in statistical significance two years
following a downsizing action. This is perhaps due to the special pays USN personnel
receive that are different than the other services. For example, submarine pay can range
from $75 to $425 per month and sea pay can be as high as $750 per month, each of which
can be received in addition to one’s basic pay and allowances. Still, after two years, the
pay raise for USN personnel becomes statistically significant in line with the other
services.
Finally, stop-loss was not statistically significant for the USMC, but was for each
of the other services. After speaking with a USMC representative from Public Affairs,
this is perhaps because the USMC does not use stop-loss as a policy as widely or
extensively as some of the other services. Still, the variable’s coefficient, while not
statistically significant, was of the correct sign, meaning stop-loss being implemented
would slightly reduce attrition rates.
Implications
For the USAF and the USN, downsizing appears to have a much stronger effect
that lasts longer than in the USA or the USMC. This is perhaps due to the mission
differences among the services. The USAF and USN are more “business-like” in their
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organizations and daily environment, whereas the USA and USMC are less like the
corporate world in their execution and mission. This is evidenced by the fact that there
are more career fields in the USA and the USMC that are combat arms, whereas the
USAF and the USN have limited combat arms-related specialties. The results indicate
there are institutional differences within each of the services that appear to influence
attrition rates differently.
Important to note as a result of this analysis is that the magnitudes of the effect of
downsizing, while statistically significant in most cases, are not extremely large, but may
have significant longer-term effects. As an example, if overall downsizing for a service
is 6% or approximately 20,000 personnel (as in the case of the USAF’s present Force
Shaping initiative for fiscal year 2007), their attrition rates would increase by 2.23% or
approximately 7.9K personnel in fiscal year 2008 and 2.22% or approximately 7.3K
personnel in fiscal year 2009 based on the results of this study. However, as discussed
previously, unexpected turnover has been estimated to cost between $75,000 and
$186,000 per departing employee, perhaps even more in the military due to the extensive
training members must complete.

For the USAF, based on the results of this study, the

effect of the downsizing action in fiscal year 2007 could cost between $592,500,000 and
$1,469,400,000 in fiscal year 2008 and $547,500,000 and $1,357,800,000 in fiscal year
2009 due to turnover costs from unexpected turnover. While the DoD’s estimated budget
for fiscal year 2008 and 2009 are $485B and $505B respectively, and the additional cost
of up to $1.469B for the USAF’s possible dysfunctional turnover in fiscal year 2008
alone amounts to less than one percent of the entire budget, these are costs the DoD
should consider, along with the proposed savings from cutting the positions, since
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budgets are dwindling and the need for modernization of weapons systems is upon us
(DoD-b, 2006:V-7). Another important issue to consider is that the service could lose
some of its “more productive or valued” employees in the 7.9K additional departures
because of role overload and lack of role clarity due to additional loss of personnel,
which could stifle the mission of many organizations. The assumption that these “more
valuable” employees would be retained (to make the restructuring following the
downsizing effective), and only those the service terminated or those who volunteered to
leave actually departed the organization, would be flawed based on the empirical studies
from the civilian sector. In sum, while the magnitudes achieved during this analysis are
not extremely large, long term effects could be substantial, as evidenced in the empirical
studies discussed previously and in the dollarized cost of possible dysfunctional turnover
of military personnel based on the results of this analysis.

Suggestions for Future Research
To enhance the research that was accomplished in this effort, four suggestions are
offered. First, a study could be conducted by following military personnel through a
downsizing action by conducting an initial survey at the start or during a downsizing
action (perhaps of the Air Force in their fiscal year 2007-2011 Force Shaping efforts of a
40,000 personnel reduction) to gauge intent to turnover on an individual basis because of
the downsizing action. Furthermore, the results of the survey could be tracked through a
review of personnel records at one year and two years following the action to determine
if the intent to turnover as collected through the survey related to actual turnover of the
individuals surveyed. Because the military has service commitments as discussed
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previously, the research would most likely cover a longer time period than is afforded
during our tenure at AFIT; however, such a study might offer more insight for the DoD in
determining whether or not to downsize, or perhaps, what might be done to mitigate
costly dysfunctional, or unplanned, turnover following future and possibly fiscallyrequired downsizing actions. Second, because the motivation to depart the service may
differ for officers and enlisted members, a researcher could look at the effects of
downsizing on attrition rates for these categories. Third, because public perception and
ultimately the morale of military members has fluctuated over the years from anti-war
sediments of the Vietnam era to the patriotic support of the post 9/11 time frame, and
back again, another researcher could study the time varying effects of such public
perceptions on attrition rates. Finally, as the results showed differences in the effects of
downsizing among the services (recall from the results that the USA had a much lower
effect than did the USAF or the USN and the USMC result for downsizing being lagged
one year was not statistically significant and two years after a downsizing action, attrition
was shown to decrease), another researcher could try to determine the reasons for
departures from the USA and the USMC and determine why these reasons might be
different than in the USAF or the USN.

Chapter Summary
As presented in this study, downsizing generally appears to affect attrition rates in
the DoD. The effect lasts longer than in the civilian sector for most services, perhaps due
to the service commitment incurred by members. While the magnitude of the effect is
not extremely large, implications of the effects could be strong and long-lasting for the
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services. Based on the results of this analysis and the dollarized implications of
downsizing actions, this research has offered one form of insight to DoD leadership to
incorporate into their decision making process when considering downsizing actions
across the DoD.
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Appendix A – List of Acronyms

AR
BLS
DMDC
DoD
ECI
MOAA
QDR
USA
USAF
USMC
USN

Autoregressive
Bureau of Labor Statistics
Defense Manpower Data Center
Department of Defense
Employment Cost Index
Military Officer Association of America
Quadrennial Defense Review
United States Army
United States Air Force
United States Marine Corps
United States Navy
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Appendix B –Stationarity Tests-Augmented Dicky Fuller
As shown below in each of the models, the null hypotheses for unit root were rejected.
The data is stationary.
Table 17. DoD Overall
Null Hypothesis: D(ATTR_DoD) has a unit root
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
Test critical values:
1% level
5% level
10% level

t-Statistic

Prob.*

-7.222675
-3.670170
-2.963972
-2.621007

0.0000

t-Statistic

Prob.*

-8.293860
-3.670170
-2.963972
-2.621007

0.0000

Table 18. USA Overall
Null Hypothesis: D(ATTR_USA) has a unit root
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
Test critical values:
1% level
5% level
10% level

Table 19. USAF Overall
Null Hypothesis: D(ATTR_USAF) has a unit root
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
Test critical values:
1% level
5% level
10% level

t-Statistic

Prob.*

-9.534385
-3.670170
-2.963972
-2.621007

0.0000

t-Statistic

Prob.*

-5.931330
-3.670170
-2.963972
-2.621007

0.0000

Table 20. USN Overall
Null Hypothesis: D(ATTR_USN) has a unit root
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
Test critical values:
1% level
5% level
10% level

Table 21. USMC Overall
Null Hypothesis: D(ATTR_USMC) has a unit root
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
Test critical values:
1% level
5% level
10% level
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t-Statistic

Prob.*

-6.471194
-3.670170
-2.963972
-2.621007

0.0000

Appendix C – Durbin-Watson Critical Values
To determine autocorrelation, if the Durbin-Watson statistic (d) ranges from zero
to the lower limit (L) of d on the chart below, there is positive autocorrelation; if it is
between the L and the upper (U) limits, autocorrelation is neither accepted nor rejected; if
it is between the U and 4 minus U, there is no autocorrelation; if it is between 4 minus U
and 4 minus L, autocorrelation is neither accepted nor rejected; if it is between 4 minus L
to 4, there is negative autocorrelation.
Table 22. Durbin-Watson Critical Values (α=5%, n 6-200)
k=l

n

k=2

k=3

k=4

k=5

dL

dU

dL

dU

dL

dU

dL

dU

dL

dU

10

0.88

1.32

0.70

1.64

0.53

2.02

0.38

2.41

0.24

2.82

15

1.08

1.36

0.95

1.54

0.82

1.75

0.69

1.97

0.56

2.21

20

1.20

1.41

1.10

1.54

1.00

1.68

0.90

1.83

0.79

1.99

25

1.29

1.45

1.21

1.55

1.12

1.66

1.04

1.77

0.95

1.89

30

1.35

1.49

1.28

1.57

1.21

1.65

1.14

1.74

1.07

1.83

35

1.40

1.52

1.34

1.58

1.28

1.65

1.22

1.73

1.16

1.80

40

1.44

1.54

1.39

1.60

1.34

1.66

1.29

1.72

1.23

1.79

45

1.48

1.57

1,43

1.62

1.38

1.67

1.34

1.72

1.29

1.78

50

1.50

1.59

1.46

1.63

1.42

1.67

1.38

1.72

1.34

1.77

55

1.53

1.60

1.49

1.64

1.45

1.68

1.41

1.72

1.38

1.77

60

1.55

1.62

1.51

1.65

1.48

1.69

1.44

1.73

1.41

1.77

65

1.57

1.63

1.54

1.66

1.50

1.70

1.47

1.73

1.44

1.77

70

1.58

1.64

1.55

1.67

1.52

1.70

1.49

1.74

1.46

1.77

75

1.60

1.65

1.57

1.68

1.54

1.71

1.51

1.74

1.49

1.77

80

1.61

1.66

1.59

1.69

1.56

1.72

1.53

1.74

1.51

1.77

85

1.62

1.67

1.60

1.70

1.57

1.72

1.55

1.75

1.52

1.77

90

1.63

1.68

1.61

1.70

1.59

1.73

1.57

1.75

1.54

1.78

95

1.64

1.69

1.62

1.71

1.60

1.73

1.58

1.75

1.56

1.78

100

1.65

1.69

1.63

1.72

1.61

1.74

1.59

1.76

1.57

1.78

Where n = number of observations and k = number of independent variables
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Table 23. Durbin-Watson Critical Values (Continued)
k=6

n

k=7

k=8

k=9

k = 10

dL

dU

dL

dU

dL

dU

dL

dU

dL

dU

15

0.45

2.47

0.34

2.73

0.25

2.98

0.18

3.22

0.11

3.44

20

0.69

2.16

0.60

2.34

0.50

2.52

0.42

2.70

0.34

2.89

25

0.87

2.01

0.78

2.14

0.70

2.28

0.62

2.42

0.54

2.56

30

1.00

1.93

0.93

2.03

0.85

2.14

0.78

2.25

0.71

2.36

35

1.10

1.88

1.03

1.97

0.97

2.05

0.91

2.14

0.85

2.24

40

1.18

1.85

1.12

1.92

1.06

2.00

1.01

2.07

0.95

2.15

45

1.24

1.84

1.19

1.90

1.14

1.96

1.09

2.02

1.04

2.09

50

1.29

1.82

1.25

1.88

1.20

1.93

1.16

1.99

1.11

2.04

55

1.33

1.81

1.29

1.86

1.25

1.91

1.21

1.96

1.17

2.01

60

1.37

1.81

1.34

1.85

1.30

1.89

1.26

1.94

1.22

1.98

65

1.40

1.81

1.37

1.84

1.34

1.88

1.30

1.92

1.27

1.96

70

1.43

1.80

1.40

1.84

1.37

1.87

1.34

1.91

1.31

1.95

75

1.46

1.80

1.43

1.83

1.40

1.87

1.37

1.90

1.34

1.94

80

1.48

1.80

1.45

1.83

1.43

1.86

1.40

1.89

1.37

1.93

85

1.50

1.80

1.47

1.83

1.49

1.86

1.42

1.89

1.40

1.92

90

1.52

1.80

1.49

1.83

1.47

1.85

1.45

1.88

1.42

1.91

95

1.54

1.80

1.51

1.83

1.49

1.85

1.46

1.88

1.44

1.90

100

1.55

1.80

1.53

1.83

1.50

1.85

1.48

1.87

1.46

1.90

Where n = number of observations and k = number of independent variables
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